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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

KALLIE J. SILL,
Petitioner-Appellee,
*

v.

Case No. 20060296-CA

JOEL GORDON SILL,
Respondent-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal is from the trial court's final order dismissing respondent-appellant
Joel Sill's petition to modify the divorce decree. (Ruling and Order - hereafter
"Order" - attached as Addendum). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal under
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (2002).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue presented for review is whether the trial court erred in dismissing Mr.
Sill's petition to modify the divorce decree (with respect to the amount of alimony it
requires him to pay) based on the court's conclusion that even a substantial-change-incircumstances modification was prohibited by the parties' stipulation, contained in the
agreement upon which the decree was based, that the decree could not be modified
except in a narrow circumstance not alleged in the petition.

Mr. Sill preserved that issue for review in his memorandum opposing Ms. Sill's
motion to dismiss his petition to modify. (R. 127-32).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) (Supp. 2005):
The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes
and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial material change
in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The facts in this case are not in dispute. As the trial court noted (Order 1-3), the
parties' decree of divorce was based on their signed written agreement. In that
agreement, Ms. Sill accepted an alimony award of $6,000 per month based on a global
settlement involving, among other things, division of approximately $1.8 million in
property. Paragraph 20 of the agreement states: "The provisions of this agreement
shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of Divorce which implements it with the
sole exception that if all of the assets have not been disclosed and divided in this
agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for appropriate disposition."
Against that backdrop, Mr. Sill sought modification of the alimony award based
on a substantial change of circumstances. The trial court dismissed his petition for
modification on the ground that the non-modification provision in the parties'
agreement precluded modification of the decree, including the award of alimony.
Order 4.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) (Supp. 2005), a trial court retains
continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of a
divorce. As the Utah Supreme Court has held, and this Court has recognized, that
statutory authority to modify an alimony award is not trumped by the parties'
agreement concerning alimony, even where there is a stipulation to an unalterable
amount of alimony. In light of that supreme court precedent, the trial court erroneously
dismissed Mr. Sill's petition to modify alimony based solely on the parties' agreement
concerning alimony and other matters related to the divorce, and the non-modification
provision contained in that agreement. That the agreement contains such a provision
does not, as the supreme court has made clear, prevent consideration of a petition to
modify alimony by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in dismissing Mr, Sill's petition to modify based on its
conclusion that the parties' stipulation concerning no modification of the divorce
decree prohibited the court from considering Mr. Sill's request to modify the
alimony award based on an alleged substantial material change in circumstances.
A.

Introduction
In dismissing Mr. Sill's petition to modify the alimony award in the parties'

divorce decree, the trial court concluded that the agreement between the parties, upon
which the divorce decree was based, precluded consideration of the petition.

Specifically, the court determined that paragraph 20 of that agreement (the nonmodification provision) prohibited a modification of alimony, because it reflected "a
clear intent of the parties to live with what they [had] agreed to" and constituted "a
knowing and specific waiver * * * of the right to modify alimony, as well as other
pro visions [.]" Order 3-4. The narrow question in this case is whether the court
correctly concluded that, in light of paragraph 20, it could not consider Mr. Sill's
request for a modification of alimony, even though under Utah law a trial court "has
continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of
the divorce." UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5(8)(g)(i) (Supp. 2005).
B.

Standard of Review
Because the trial court's dismissal of Mr. Sill's petition ultimately involved

interpretation of section 30-3-5(8)(g)(i), this Court reviews its decision for correctness.
Diener v. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, 1 4, 98 P.3d 1178, cert, denied, 106 P.3d 743
(Utah 2005).
C.

The trial court's ruling is contrary to Utah Supreme Court precedent and
therefore should be reversed.
The issue on appeal is straightforward: Did the trial court err in concluding that

the parties' agreement, which contains a non-modification provision, trumps the court's
statutory authority to make substantive changes and new orders regarding alimony
based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of

the divorce? The simple answer is that the court clearly erred, because the Utah
Supreme Court has held that with respect to an alimony award, a court retains the
power to modify the award when a change in circumstances justifies it, in spite of the
parties' efforts to control the matter by contract.
In Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707 (Utah 1985), the supreme court rejected the
argument that the trial court lacked the power to modify an alimony award in light of
the parties' stipulated settlement on the matter. Citing section 30-3-5(1), the court said
that "[t]he language of the statute makes it clear that the appellant's position that the
trial court lacked power or jurisdiction to modify an alimony award is without merit."
700 P.2d at 709. It noted that it had "rejected a similar argument respecting a
stipulated settlement requiring periodic payments in Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34,
261 P.2d 944 (1953)." Id. The court then quoted the controlling language from
Callister:
"We further hold that these [monthly payment] provisions are not an
inseparable part of the agreement relating to division of property and by
approval of the agreement in the decree the court did not divest itself of
jurisdiction under the statute to make such subsequent changes and orders
with respect to alimony payments as might be reasonable and proper,
based upon change of circumstances. We hold this to be true even though
the provisions of the agreement should be interpreted to mean that the
parties intended to stipulate for a fixed and unalterable amount of
alimony. The object and purpose of the statute is to give the courts power
to enforce, after divorce, the duty of support which exists between a
husband and wife or parent and child. Legislators who enacted the law
were probably aware of the fact, which is a matter of common knowledge
to trial courts, that parties to divorce suits frequently enter into
agreements relative to alimony or for child support which, if binding upon
the courts, would leave children or divorced wives inadequately provided

for. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the law was intended to give
the courts power to disregard the stipulations or agreement of the parties
in the first instance and enter judgment for such alimony or child support
as appears reasonable, and to thereafter modify such judgments when
change of circumstances justifies it, regardless of attempts of the parties to
control the matter by contract.
700 P.2d at 709-10 (quoting Callister, 1 Utah 2d at 41, 261 P.2d at 948-49, brackets
and emphasis added by Naylor court).
The trial court's dismissal of Mr. Sill's petition to modify the alimony award
based solely on the parties' agreement is directly contrary to Naylor and Callister. This
Court recently applied those decisions in reversing a trial court's denial of a father's
petition to modify a child-support obligation based solely on the father's earlier
stipulation concerning that obligation. Diener, 2004 UT App 314, t 5 (citing Naylor
and Callister). The analysis employed in Diener applies with equal force in the instant
case. The error the trial court committed here is indistinguishable from the error the
trial court committed in Diener. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial
court's dismissal of Mr. Sill's petition to modify. Under Naylor, Callister, and Diener,
the trial court must consider Mr. Sill's contention that a modification of the alimony
award is justified based on a substantial change of circumstances, notwithstanding the
parties' pre-divorce agreement to an unalterable amount for alimony.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should reverse the trial court's
order dismissing Mr. Sill's petition to modify and remand the case for consideration of
the merits of that petition.
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Because clear Utah Supreme Court precedent controls this case, oral argument is
unnecessary.
Dated this

fCv
day of August 2006.
CHRISTINA I. MILLER
MILLER VANCE & THOMPSON PC
Attorneys for Respondent-Appellant
Joel Gordon Sill
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
KALLIE J. SILL,
RULING and ORDER
Petitioner,
Case No. 004600060
vs.
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK
JOEL GORDON SILL,
Respondent.
DATE: February 22, 2006
The above matter came before the court for decision on
Petitioner's Motion to dismiss respondent's petition to modify.
In this case a decree was entered March 7, 2001.

Respondent

filed a petition to modify the decree September 13, 2005.
Petitioner moved to dismiss that petition on September 26, 2005.
Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss on October 12, 2005, and
petitioner replied October 20, 2005.

The court scheduled oral

argument for January 23, 2006. In the meantime petitioner filed a
motion to have respondent held in contempt.

At oral argument,

for the first time as neither party briefed the issue, it was
pointed out that there was a provision in the decree that it was
non-modifiable.
Accordingly, the court asked the parties to brief the issue
concerning the effect of that provision on the pending motions.
Respondent filed her memo February 2, 2006, and petitioner
filed a response February 10, 2006. Respondent filed a reply and
Notice to Submit on February 21, 2006.

The court has reviewed the pleadings of the parties and the
entire file, and concludes as follows.

ARGUMENTS
Respondent argues that even if there is a stipulation, the
court can always modify alimony under UCA 30-3-5(8) (g) , wherein
the court is given continuing jurisdiction to make new orders
concerning alimony. Respondent argues the court has the ability
to go beyond an agreement and order what alimony is reasonable.
Petitioner urges that the decree was based on arms-length
negotiations, wherein petitioner agreed to accept ten years,
alimony at $6000 per month (the parties were married 18 years)
based on a global settlement involving a substantial property
settlement of approximately $1.8 million.
If there was a meeting of the minds, the contract should be
binding. If there is a clear and unmistakable waiver of some
right, that will be upheld and equity should not and does not
reinstate rights voluntarily bargained away by agreement.

Both

parties had counsel and each party benefitted in the decree and
both suffered some detriment.

DISCUSSION
This case presents a difficult question to the court. There

-2-

is language in cases cited by each party that supports their
positions.

Thus, to the court, the issue is really one of the

intent of the parties, whether that intent is expressed clearly
and unmistakably in the decree. The decree was based on a signed
written agreement of the parties, each with competent and present
counsel.

Paragraph 20 of the agreement states "The provisions of

this agreement shall be non-modifiable as shall the Decree of
Divorce which implements it with the sole exception that if all
of the assets have not been disclosed and divided in this
agreement, those may be brought back before the Court for
appropriate disposition."

To the court, that is a knowing and

specific waiver, not a waiver of alimony, but a waiver of the
right to modify alimony, as well as other provisions, with an
exception not alleged or present in this case.
This is not a waiver of alimony case where there are changed
circumstances.

Substantial assets were present and there was

obviously give and take in the process of the settlement. This is
not a case where the parties were or are acting pro

se or where

it appears one party was taken advantage of so that equitable
powers ought to intervene and "repair" an unfair agreement. From
all that appears there was adequate consideration and the
agreement is not on its face unconscionable nor even unfair. No
public policy seems to be violated in this agreement that
resulted in the decree.
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This agreement was between two competent and accomplished
persons with two competent and accomplished counsel.

There is no

suggestion of coercion involved in this instance nor fundamental
unfairness.

Even though there is now alleged a change of

circumstances, to allow the settlement now to be changed by
either party would, as the courts of this state have noted,
encourage fraud and discourage settlements.

Settlements would

never be final and so settlements would not occur and more
litigation would result rather than having cases settle.
The court believes the non-modification provision is clear
and encompasses not only alimony but all provisions of the
decree.

While it did not specify alimony, it was the last

paragraph of the agreement and the decree, indicating to Lhe
court a clear intent of the parties to live with what they agreed
to.
The motion to dismiss the petition to modify is GRANTED.

To

the extent petitioner now also seeks a change of the decree in
her January 17, 2006, filing, that relief is not appropriate
under this reasoning.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
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order is required.

DATED this ^

day o f M

,

2006.

BY TH-E;;,,e-0UR5>
/' /
BRUCE C. LUBECK
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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